Carl's published research of the Internet and social media
The 101 of Disinformation Detection
Not every organisation can or should become a disinformation detective. But disinformation can threaten the activities, objectives and individuals associated with civil society groups and their work. Disinformation tactics and the responses in place to try to mitigate them online are changing rapidly. Organisations witnessing or targeted by disinformation therefore require a baseline understanding of the threats posed by disinformation and how to spot them while conducting their work. This toolkit sets out simple steps to do so.
Warring Songs: Information Operations in the Digital Age
We find that the widely held focus on ‘fake news’ is overblown. Data analysis of content targeting Germany, Italy and France found the news stories used to be overwhelmingly from reputable sources. Information operations frequently involve tactics not easily fact-checked: the selective amplification of reputable, mainstream media stories to fit an agenda, harassment, abuse, emotional manipulation and poisoning of channels of communication.
Radical Beliefs and Violent Behaviour
A chapter reviewing the evidence of the relationship between violent beliefs and violent behaviour, ideas and action.
Developing a Civil Society Response to Online Manipulation
This document presents a vision for a pan-civil societal response to online manipulation. In part, it argues, this will come down to capability: building a pooled detection capacity to function as a transparent, public interest alternative to those built by the tech giants. In part, it will require new organisational philosophies and forms of co-operation, and in part new approaches to funding and support.